Identity, Independence and the Americans

American Independence was partly brought about by a rapidly narrowing perception of ‘Britishness’ - The rise of the SNP and the drive for Scottish Independence is no different.

I have recently decided to become a student. I mean technically, I’ve been at the University of Edinburgh since 2010, but I realise now that my relationship with the academic side of things was somewhat distant. In first year, being a ‘student’ involved trying desperately hard to live up (or perhaps down) to a crude, self-destructive (but apparently very enjoyable) stereotype created and reinforced by Hollywood and the wider media, as seen in the highly entertaining series 'Fresh Meat'. However, there comes a point during the early weeks of second year, as the deadlines pile up, that you realise being a ‘student’ is at least partially connected to the concept of ‘study’. So, I have been trying very hard to move from my bed to my desk, open my laptop, close Facebook, and open this nifty little programme called ‘Microsoft Word’. I have, in a somewhat radical departure from that crumbling stereotype, begun to ‘study’.

Why is this in any way relevant to Scottish politics? Well, what I’m trying to point out is that our perceptions of our own place in the world, and the definitions we attempt to give ourselves, are endlessly flexible. They are almost entirely dependent on circumstance, and as circumstances change, we begin to define ourselves and those around us differently. In addition, one of the great advantages of my new approach to the art of studentry is that I have begun to learn things. In particular, I have begun to learn things about the American Revolution, and I will focus on that here.

It turns out that in the modern Scottish political climate, various historical interpretations of the American Revolution offer some thought-provoking insights. For those unfamiliar with the basics, here’s a very brief outline – the colonies of North America were largely self-governing states until political changes in England led to increased intervention across the Atlantic. Growing protests against commercial tax rises and a lack of British democratic legitimacy in the colonies led to rapidly escalating tensions, eventually boiling over into full-blown revolution and finally American Independence.

This is obviously an incredibly generalised and easily disputed version of events, but it will have to do in setting the scene. What is important is that the early days of the revolution raise an important question: Why did increased intervention lead to such passionate and escalating anti-imperialist protest, when Americans had previously been so comfortable with their place in the empire?

The answer to this question can be boiled down to one crucial factor, and it is this factor which gives the revolution such relevance in modern Scottish politics. The American academic T.H. Breen gives a compelling argument that one of the primary motives of the rebel colonists was a powerful yearning to express, or discover, their own national identity. This identity was not, however, that of the now-ubiquitous idea of the ‘American’, but instead it was a desire to be recognised as ‘British’ on equal terms with the famously liberated, respected and cultured ‘Englishmen’. Breen suggests that before and during the revolution, the concept of ‘Britishness’ was transformed from an inclusive, imperial definition that spanned colonies across the globe (although, perhaps, focusing largely on the white populations of those colonies) into an exclusive, metropolitan and distinctly English vision of Britishness. London and England, as the cultural, economic and political hub of empire, had become the model for Britain, and the peripheries were seen as just that – distant, secondary and relatively uncivilised.

This was particularly jarring with the American colonies - the jingoistic glory of the Seven Years’ War had given Americans a great deal of pride in their Britishness, as they fought beside their imperial compatriots against the French. The sudden recalibration of Britishness around an Anglocentric urban elite left Americans feeling shocked and betrayed, with an identity they had felt powerfully connected to suddenly wrenched away from them in a callous and aggressive manner. It was not, therefore, a yearning to be ‘American’ that motivated the colonists – indeed, the term ‘American’ was being used by the English at least a decade before the colonies – but rather a feeling of having their British identity pulled away from them in such an unexpected and insensitive way. It was, argues Breen, only natural that the attempt to fill that void should manifest itself with such passion.

So to Scotland. Over two hundred years later, it is becoming increasingly clear that the concept of ‘Britishness’ is not, as unionists and much of the media would suggest, being undermined and degraded by the proponents of Scottish independence. In recent years it has become evident that whenever the symbols of Britishness – the BBC, Westminster, the NHS and the military – become centralised and anglicised by a London elite, the forces of Scottish nationalism roar into life, buoyed by a Scottish public feeling excluded and ignored.

Let us look at those great ‘British’ institutions. The BBC, despite recent efforts, is undeniably London-centric. Scotland may or may not punch above its weight on national television, but the programming is still largely obsessed with the hustle and bustle of the UK capital. The NHS has already been devolved, and is now at risk of becoming a purely Scottish institution as Andrew Lansley somehow gets away with his brutal dismantling of one of the greatest institutions in the world, never mind the United Kingdom. The military has been sent on two extremely controversial wars in recent years, and as a result is irreversibly associated with the slimy and mendacious world of Westminster politics.

It is Westminster that is the most crucial part of this puzzle. Those other institutions have always been relatively London-centric, and the BBC has certainly improved recently, but when they are combined with the elitist, exclusive and quintessentially, archaically English world of Westminster politics, they make a potent cocktail of which the Scottish people have had more than enough.

Let us look now at the great figureheads of Britain over the years. Back in the smoggy, industrial days of the 20th century, the emerging Labour party was fuelled by the charisma and passion of working-class Scots, many of whom were incredibly capable statesmen. Thus, Scotland had its place in Westminster, and it was the Labour Party. Then, along came Maggie. The Thatcher/Major years, and their impact on Scottish and UK politics, has been written about enough, so I will not detail their impact here. What I will emphasise is the way that Margaret Thatcher’s success in the richest, most populous and metropolitan region of the UK allowed her to win three successive terms as prime minister of a south that was largely supportive, and a north that hated her on a furious, visceral level and still does. One of her greatest contributions to politics was to convince the faltering Labour Party that to achieve success, they needed to win over the voters of the south. If they could do that, they could rely on the loyalty of the Scots to win an enormous majority. The excellent C4 drama 'The Deal' demonstrates very clearly that one of Tony Blair’s greatest advantages in reforming the Labour Party and redefining their support was his Englishness, and that one of Gordon Brown’s greatest weaknesses was seen as his Scottishness. There is nothing more elucidating about the growth of modern Scottish nationalism than this. As Tony Blair’s success slowly created a new kind of politician – look at Cameron, Clegg and Miliband – the Scots began to wonder who was really representing them. Devolution, in this scenario, just is not enough. This is not about who makes policy – it is about identity. When all the potential leaders of your country come from a background, a place and an education that you are relatively incapable of relating to, is it not normal to begin to focus on where you really call home?

The Scottish National Party’s greatest successes of their history came at times when England appeared to have stolen the metaphorical duvet of Britishness, leaving Scotland shivering in the cold. In 2007, Tony Blair, with all his Islington charm, had been prime minister for a decade. New Labour had taken a clear leap towards the Thatcherite ‘New Right’, and were presenting a public face designed specifically to appeal to the South of England – a place that appeared as distant from Scotland as any other country. In 2011, David Cameron was at the head of a trio of distinctly English, metropolitan and Oxbridge-educated party leaders, shifting the country ever closer to the aforementioned neo-Thatcherite consensus.

The slide appears irreversible, as the ‘floating voters’ of the English south shout ever louder and the politicians cosy up ever closer to bankers and right-wing reactionaries. Scotland, relatively (but not entirely) safe in the protective bubble of devolution, watches in horror as English urban society degrades into violence and entrenched stratification. The Scottish Government, on the other hand, is clearly putting Scottish interests at the very front of its agenda, attempting to undo the damage done by decades of neglect. Unlike the American colonists, the Scots need not search frantically around for a new identity. Scotland is a far older nation than Britain ever will be, and the Scottish identity has never, despite the best efforts of certain political figures throughout history, been allowed to die. What we see now is that identity reasserting itself, after years playing second-fiddle to a sense of Britishness strengthened by world wars and a Westminster parliament that had a clear Scottish voice. That Britishness has, post-Thatcher, become dominated by the south of England once again. The people of Scotland, like the American colonists, know full well that they are not a mere ‘periphery’, and are in the process of refusing to be treated like one.

James C. Davies’ general theory of revolution proposes that the main force driving revolutions is that of ‘frustrated expectations… as a result of a general closing of society after a prolonged period of apparently becoming increasingly more open.’ This can, in this case, be refocused and applied to the changes in British identity. During the seven years’ war, Americans felt more British, and yet these expectations were frustrated when England asserted its exclusive ownership of the term. During the 20th century, Britain was united by two wars and the care of the welfare state, until the expectations of those on the ‘peripheries’ were frustrated by an aggressive dismantling of this welfare state by a London-centric political elite and the use of the military as a political and ideological tool (observe Thatcher’s use of the Falklands for political gain, and Blair’s clumsy invasion of Iraq), rather than the defenders of freedom they were perceived to be after the second world war. Let us also not forget the sheer horror of the nuclear weapons on the west coast. As the Westminster political classes continue to assert their hollow vision of Britishness in a way that only emphasises the gulf between them and the politics, culture and history of the Scottish people, the rapid disintegration of the shared identity that once bound the Union together will only accelerate.

What can be learned from this? Firstly, that Scottish nationalism is more than a political tool – it is a natural force, and most importantly not a negative one. Scottish nationalism is a reaction against an insular, exclusive national identity and a desire for something new, radical and forward-looking. Second, that no matter how much the referendum campaign focuses on policy, party leaders or media spend, the power of identity cannot be underestimated in shaping the direction of debate. If the unionists can persuade the Scottish people that they are still invested enough in the notion of Britain for a political union to continue, they can win the debate. That will be an uphill struggle. All the nationalists need to do is gently and carefully remind the Scottish people that they are no longer included in the modern framework of the British identity, pointing to the distant parliament of the south, and the debate for independence will be won.

There has never been a more exciting time to be a student and a nationalist. I may enter full-time employment in a newly independent Scotland. As Alex Salmond has made very clear, there is little doubt now that this will be the independence generation. Like the American revolutionary leaders, he has deftly steered a bandwagon towards independence that will be very hard to stop. One of those revolutionary leaders, Paul Revere, famously (although this is partly myth) rode his horse through Massachusetts, shouting “The British are coming!” In Scotland, though, it is quite different. The British are not coming, nor are they going. They are simply fading away.

Some further reading (and a rough bibliography) for those who are interested:

Breen, T.H. – ‘Ideology and Nationalism on the Eve of the American Revolution: Revisions Once More in Need of Revising’, The Journal of American History 84 (1997), pp.13-39

Reid Jr, Joseph D. – ‘Economic Burden: Spark to the American Revolution?’, The Journal of Economic History 38 (March 1978), pp.81-100

Countryman, Edward – ‘Indians, the Colonial Order, and the Social Significance of the American Revolution’, William and Mary Quarterly 53 (April 1996), pp.342-362

Greene, Jack P. – ‘The Social Origins of the American Revolution: An Evaluation and Interpretation’, Political Science Quarterly 88 (March 1973), pp.1-22