Identity, Independence and the Americans: An Historiographical Ear-bashing

I've recieved the following response to my previous post from somebody who appears to know a lot more about this than me. It does, to some extent, trample a great deal of my case into the proverbial mud. However, the thing that fascinated me about the Breen piece was the way that his interpretation has such relevance to the state of contemporary British politics, and I think the broader conclusions that I make about this remain valid. In this case, Breen's (apparently somewhat inaccurate) interpretation of the causes of the revolution can still be used allegorically to illustrate a crucial point about the nature of Scottish nationalism. I'm not clutching at straws, I swear.

“American Independence was partly brought about by a rapidly narrowing perception of ‘Britishness’" - what a load of rubbish. There were several important reasons for American independence, but this was definitely not one of them. Here are some of the really important reasons:

(A) Some of the American colonies (not all of them) had played an active part in the war which they called the French and Indian War, and other folk called the Seven Years War. The New England colonies expected to be rewarded by being given Canada. If you look at a map, you will see that the land to the west of New England is Canada. They wanted westward expansion, which meant expansion into Canada. But the French-speaking, Catholic, Canadiens were frightened of the ultra-protestant New Englanders. The Catholic Church did a deal with the British under which they would keep Canada loyal to the Crown in return for Britain resisting the demands of the New Englanders. Massachusetts etc were furious. But when the American revolt began, Canada, despite being French-speaking and only recently acquired by conquest from France, stayed loyal. Canada didn’t become mainly English-speaking until near the end of the War of Independence - when huge numbers of loyalist Americans fled there as refugees.

(B) The Proclamation Line. The colonies to the south of New England were also blocked from Western expansion, not because of Canada, but because Britain had made an agreement with the native tribes that all of the land to the west of the peaks of the Appalachian mountain chain should remain “Indian Territory”.

(C) Lord Mansfield’s court judgement of 1773. A slave belonging to an owner who was visiting London escaped, was recaptured, and his owner attempted to put him on a ship back to America against his will. Lord Mansfield decreed that this could not be done, the slave was a free man as the Law of England did not recognise the state of slavery. Southern slave-owners such as Patrick Henry, George Washington, and Thomas Jefferson were afraid that Lord Mansfield’s principle would, sooner or later, be extended from the “mother country” to the colonies. (As did in fact happen some years later when slavery was abolished throughout the British Empire.) The South supported independence in order to defend slavery. John Adams, the representative of Massachusetts, who became Vice President and then the second President of the USA, agreed that slavery would continue in the USA, in return for the support of George Washington etc.

“The American academic T.H. Breen gives a compelling argument that one of the primary motives of the rebel colonists was a powerful yearning to express, or discover, their own national identity.” - what a load of codswallop. They didn’t HAVE a “national” identity. Each colony saw itself as being separate from the other colonies. If folk from a colony travelled, it was more likely to be to London, or Edinburgh, than to one of the other colonies. In the early days, there were no universities in America, so an American who wanted further education had to cross the Atlantic. However, the only universities in England were Oxford and Cambridge - and both of those were closed to most Americans. These English universities required that all students had to be members of the Church of England. Many Americans were Baptist, or Congregationalist, or Presbyterian, and so disqualified. So, Americans went to Edinburgh, or Aberdeen, or Glasgow, or St Andrews, instead: they had no such prohibition on students who were not C of E.

“This identity was not, however, that of the now-ubiquitous idea of the ‘American’, but instead it was a desire to be recognised as ‘British’ “ - Breen is correct that they didn't see themselves as "American", but wrong in saying they saw themselves as "British". In so far as many Americans had an identity other than that of their own colony, it wasn’t “British” - it was ENGLISH. In New England, folk from Scotland were definitely seen as “foreign”, on the grounds of not being English.

“Breen suggests that before and during the revolution, the concept of ‘Britishness’ was transformed from an inclusive, imperial definition that spanned colonies across the globe (although, perhaps, focusing largely on the white populations of those colonies) into an exclusive, metropolitan and distinctly English vision of Britishness.” - again, what a load of rubbish. The English, both in England and in New England, always DID have a narrow conception which equated “British” and “English”. There was nothing new about this, they’d always thought like that.

“The jingoistic glory of the Seven Years’ War had given Americans a great deal of pride in their Britishness, as they fought beside their imperial compatriots against the French” - and the most important result of that war, so far as North America was concerned, was that the French, and French-speaking, colony of Canada came under British rule. The problem was, the aggressively Anglo- and Protestant New Englanders didn’t get their way about taking over Canada.

“Those other institutions have always been relatively London-centric, and the BBC has certainly improved recently, but when they are combined with the elitist, exclusive and quintessentially, archaically English world of Westminster politics, they make a potent cocktail of which the Scottish people have had more than enough. “ - all this is true. The bit that is NOT true is suggesting this has something to do with the reason why the USA became independent. It doesn’t.

Identity, Independence and the Americans

American Independence was partly brought about by a rapidly narrowing perception of ‘Britishness’ - The rise of the SNP and the drive for Scottish Independence is no different.

I have recently decided to become a student. I mean technically, I’ve been at the University of Edinburgh since 2010, but I realise now that my relationship with the academic side of things was somewhat distant. In first year, being a ‘student’ involved trying desperately hard to live up (or perhaps down) to a crude, self-destructive (but apparently very enjoyable) stereotype created and reinforced by Hollywood and the wider media, as seen in the highly entertaining series 'Fresh Meat'. However, there comes a point during the early weeks of second year, as the deadlines pile up, that you realise being a ‘student’ is at least partially connected to the concept of ‘study’. So, I have been trying very hard to move from my bed to my desk, open my laptop, close Facebook, and open this nifty little programme called ‘Microsoft Word’. I have, in a somewhat radical departure from that crumbling stereotype, begun to ‘study’.

Why is this in any way relevant to Scottish politics? Well, what I’m trying to point out is that our perceptions of our own place in the world, and the definitions we attempt to give ourselves, are endlessly flexible. They are almost entirely dependent on circumstance, and as circumstances change, we begin to define ourselves and those around us differently. In addition, one of the great advantages of my new approach to the art of studentry is that I have begun to learn things. In particular, I have begun to learn things about the American Revolution, and I will focus on that here.

It turns out that in the modern Scottish political climate, various historical interpretations of the American Revolution offer some thought-provoking insights. For those unfamiliar with the basics, here’s a very brief outline – the colonies of North America were largely self-governing states until political changes in England led to increased intervention across the Atlantic. Growing protests against commercial tax rises and a lack of British democratic legitimacy in the colonies led to rapidly escalating tensions, eventually boiling over into full-blown revolution and finally American Independence.

This is obviously an incredibly generalised and easily disputed version of events, but it will have to do in setting the scene. What is important is that the early days of the revolution raise an important question: Why did increased intervention lead to such passionate and escalating anti-imperialist protest, when Americans had previously been so comfortable with their place in the empire?

The answer to this question can be boiled down to one crucial factor, and it is this factor which gives the revolution such relevance in modern Scottish politics. The American academic T.H. Breen gives a compelling argument that one of the primary motives of the rebel colonists was a powerful yearning to express, or discover, their own national identity. This identity was not, however, that of the now-ubiquitous idea of the ‘American’, but instead it was a desire to be recognised as ‘British’ on equal terms with the famously liberated, respected and cultured ‘Englishmen’. Breen suggests that before and during the revolution, the concept of ‘Britishness’ was transformed from an inclusive, imperial definition that spanned colonies across the globe (although, perhaps, focusing largely on the white populations of those colonies) into an exclusive, metropolitan and distinctly English vision of Britishness. London and England, as the cultural, economic and political hub of empire, had become the model for Britain, and the peripheries were seen as just that – distant, secondary and relatively uncivilised.

This was particularly jarring with the American colonies - the jingoistic glory of the Seven Years’ War had given Americans a great deal of pride in their Britishness, as they fought beside their imperial compatriots against the French. The sudden recalibration of Britishness around an Anglocentric urban elite left Americans feeling shocked and betrayed, with an identity they had felt powerfully connected to suddenly wrenched away from them in a callous and aggressive manner. It was not, therefore, a yearning to be ‘American’ that motivated the colonists – indeed, the term ‘American’ was being used by the English at least a decade before the colonies – but rather a feeling of having their British identity pulled away from them in such an unexpected and insensitive way. It was, argues Breen, only natural that the attempt to fill that void should manifest itself with such passion.

So to Scotland. Over two hundred years later, it is becoming increasingly clear that the concept of ‘Britishness’ is not, as unionists and much of the media would suggest, being undermined and degraded by the proponents of Scottish independence. In recent years it has become evident that whenever the symbols of Britishness – the BBC, Westminster, the NHS and the military – become centralised and anglicised by a London elite, the forces of Scottish nationalism roar into life, buoyed by a Scottish public feeling excluded and ignored.

Let us look at those great ‘British’ institutions. The BBC, despite recent efforts, is undeniably London-centric. Scotland may or may not punch above its weight on national television, but the programming is still largely obsessed with the hustle and bustle of the UK capital. The NHS has already been devolved, and is now at risk of becoming a purely Scottish institution as Andrew Lansley somehow gets away with his brutal dismantling of one of the greatest institutions in the world, never mind the United Kingdom. The military has been sent on two extremely controversial wars in recent years, and as a result is irreversibly associated with the slimy and mendacious world of Westminster politics.

It is Westminster that is the most crucial part of this puzzle. Those other institutions have always been relatively London-centric, and the BBC has certainly improved recently, but when they are combined with the elitist, exclusive and quintessentially, archaically English world of Westminster politics, they make a potent cocktail of which the Scottish people have had more than enough.

Let us look now at the great figureheads of Britain over the years. Back in the smoggy, industrial days of the 20th century, the emerging Labour party was fuelled by the charisma and passion of working-class Scots, many of whom were incredibly capable statesmen. Thus, Scotland had its place in Westminster, and it was the Labour Party. Then, along came Maggie. The Thatcher/Major years, and their impact on Scottish and UK politics, has been written about enough, so I will not detail their impact here. What I will emphasise is the way that Margaret Thatcher’s success in the richest, most populous and metropolitan region of the UK allowed her to win three successive terms as prime minister of a south that was largely supportive, and a north that hated her on a furious, visceral level and still does. One of her greatest contributions to politics was to convince the faltering Labour Party that to achieve success, they needed to win over the voters of the south. If they could do that, they could rely on the loyalty of the Scots to win an enormous majority. The excellent C4 drama 'The Deal' demonstrates very clearly that one of Tony Blair’s greatest advantages in reforming the Labour Party and redefining their support was his Englishness, and that one of Gordon Brown’s greatest weaknesses was seen as his Scottishness. There is nothing more elucidating about the growth of modern Scottish nationalism than this. As Tony Blair’s success slowly created a new kind of politician – look at Cameron, Clegg and Miliband – the Scots began to wonder who was really representing them. Devolution, in this scenario, just is not enough. This is not about who makes policy – it is about identity. When all the potential leaders of your country come from a background, a place and an education that you are relatively incapable of relating to, is it not normal to begin to focus on where you really call home?

The Scottish National Party’s greatest successes of their history came at times when England appeared to have stolen the metaphorical duvet of Britishness, leaving Scotland shivering in the cold. In 2007, Tony Blair, with all his Islington charm, had been prime minister for a decade. New Labour had taken a clear leap towards the Thatcherite ‘New Right’, and were presenting a public face designed specifically to appeal to the South of England – a place that appeared as distant from Scotland as any other country. In 2011, David Cameron was at the head of a trio of distinctly English, metropolitan and Oxbridge-educated party leaders, shifting the country ever closer to the aforementioned neo-Thatcherite consensus.

The slide appears irreversible, as the ‘floating voters’ of the English south shout ever louder and the politicians cosy up ever closer to bankers and right-wing reactionaries. Scotland, relatively (but not entirely) safe in the protective bubble of devolution, watches in horror as English urban society degrades into violence and entrenched stratification. The Scottish Government, on the other hand, is clearly putting Scottish interests at the very front of its agenda, attempting to undo the damage done by decades of neglect. Unlike the American colonists, the Scots need not search frantically around for a new identity. Scotland is a far older nation than Britain ever will be, and the Scottish identity has never, despite the best efforts of certain political figures throughout history, been allowed to die. What we see now is that identity reasserting itself, after years playing second-fiddle to a sense of Britishness strengthened by world wars and a Westminster parliament that had a clear Scottish voice. That Britishness has, post-Thatcher, become dominated by the south of England once again. The people of Scotland, like the American colonists, know full well that they are not a mere ‘periphery’, and are in the process of refusing to be treated like one.

James C. Davies’ general theory of revolution proposes that the main force driving revolutions is that of ‘frustrated expectations… as a result of a general closing of society after a prolonged period of apparently becoming increasingly more open.’ This can, in this case, be refocused and applied to the changes in British identity. During the seven years’ war, Americans felt more British, and yet these expectations were frustrated when England asserted its exclusive ownership of the term. During the 20th century, Britain was united by two wars and the care of the welfare state, until the expectations of those on the ‘peripheries’ were frustrated by an aggressive dismantling of this welfare state by a London-centric political elite and the use of the military as a political and ideological tool (observe Thatcher’s use of the Falklands for political gain, and Blair’s clumsy invasion of Iraq), rather than the defenders of freedom they were perceived to be after the second world war. Let us also not forget the sheer horror of the nuclear weapons on the west coast. As the Westminster political classes continue to assert their hollow vision of Britishness in a way that only emphasises the gulf between them and the politics, culture and history of the Scottish people, the rapid disintegration of the shared identity that once bound the Union together will only accelerate.

What can be learned from this? Firstly, that Scottish nationalism is more than a political tool – it is a natural force, and most importantly not a negative one. Scottish nationalism is a reaction against an insular, exclusive national identity and a desire for something new, radical and forward-looking. Second, that no matter how much the referendum campaign focuses on policy, party leaders or media spend, the power of identity cannot be underestimated in shaping the direction of debate. If the unionists can persuade the Scottish people that they are still invested enough in the notion of Britain for a political union to continue, they can win the debate. That will be an uphill struggle. All the nationalists need to do is gently and carefully remind the Scottish people that they are no longer included in the modern framework of the British identity, pointing to the distant parliament of the south, and the debate for independence will be won.

There has never been a more exciting time to be a student and a nationalist. I may enter full-time employment in a newly independent Scotland. As Alex Salmond has made very clear, there is little doubt now that this will be the independence generation. Like the American revolutionary leaders, he has deftly steered a bandwagon towards independence that will be very hard to stop. One of those revolutionary leaders, Paul Revere, famously (although this is partly myth) rode his horse through Massachusetts, shouting “The British are coming!” In Scotland, though, it is quite different. The British are not coming, nor are they going. They are simply fading away.

Some further reading (and a rough bibliography) for those who are interested:

Breen, T.H. – ‘Ideology and Nationalism on the Eve of the American Revolution: Revisions Once More in Need of Revising’, The Journal of American History 84 (1997), pp.13-39

Reid Jr, Joseph D. – ‘Economic Burden: Spark to the American Revolution?’, The Journal of Economic History 38 (March 1978), pp.81-100

Countryman, Edward – ‘Indians, the Colonial Order, and the Social Significance of the American Revolution’, William and Mary Quarterly 53 (April 1996), pp.342-362

Greene, Jack P. – ‘The Social Origins of the American Revolution: An Evaluation and Interpretation’, Political Science Quarterly 88 (March 1973), pp.1-22

The Dangers of the 'Big Tent'

John Mason’s motion on equal marriage has exposed the fragility of the SNP’s ‘big tent’.

A recent post by The Burd on the need for Scottish Labour to simplify its aims and message did an excellent job of highlighting one of the main reasons for the SNP’s success over Labour in recent years.

It pointed out that Labour’s core beliefs, while being admirable, are complex and difficult to articulate in a way that resonates across Scottish society. The SNP’s mission statement, on the other hand, is simple: ‘Independence for Scotland and the furtherance of Scottish interests’. This simple, somewhat populist message is easy to understand and easy to agree with, and it is this accessibility that has created what has been referred to as the SNP’s ‘big tent’.

Under the canopy of ‘furthering Scottish interests’, socialists can march beside arch-capitalists and liberals beside conservatives without needing to tear themselves apart. Those who support independence do so for a variety of different reasons, but all are happy to work together to achieve it.

In many ways it was predictable that the ‘big tent’ – which allowed the SNP to win May’s election so emphatically – could become a victim of its own success. Minority government was in many ways the perfect atmosphere for the SNP. Faced with an opposition that outnumbered them when united, they displayed a unity that won plaudits across the media. The leadership, all too aware that every vote counted, was careful to avoid alienating the left or right wings of the party.

During the election campaign, one of the most common appraisals of the SNP’s time in government was that they had been competent and effective, but hadn’t exactly ‘set the heather alight’ – an accurate analysis of a party that achieved a great deal through unity, but perhaps avoided doing a great deal more out of fear of jeopardising this. Even as the party began the fight for re-election, trailing labour in the polls and needing something exciting to grab the attention of the voters, controversial or divisive policy proposals were kept away from the manifesto in favour of ambitious but electorally safe options with a broad appeal. Once again, it paid off.

And so to majority government. The leadership had barely finished hammering in the final pegs of the freshly erected big tent (perhaps a marquee this time?) when up popped the Scottish Youth Parliament with a widely reported campaign for equal marriage. Vocal support for the campaign from MSPs Marco Biagi and Patrick Harvie attracted more headlines, and the issue was thrust to the front of the Scottish political stage. Enter John Mason, representing what could be seen as the ‘socially conservative’ wing of the party, with a motion calling for recognition of the range of views on the topic and a plea for nobody to be forced into approving of or being involved in gay marriage.

While I personally disagree with the motion and what it asks for, it did not strike me as an attempt to explicitly condemn homosexuality or gay marriage, but simply an appeal for recognition of all sides of the debate and a commitment not to force churches to do something against their will. Mason has said that he is ‘completely relaxed about gay marriage’, and it could be the case that his motion was just a poorly worded attempt to add an extra dimension to the debate. If that is the case, Mason must have watched with horror as the majority of commentators and parliamentarians came out against it, branding it homophobic at worst and irrelevant at best.

He did find some support, however, from three of his SNP colleagues – Bill Walker, Richard Lyle and Dave Thompson. I am not entirely familiar with every member of the parliament’s new intake, so I am going to assume – and correct me if I’m wrong – that these supporters would join Mason on the aforementioned ‘socially conservative’ wing of the party, along with a few others who stayed silent during the debate. The motion drew powerful condemnation, however, from those on the more liberal side of the party. MEP Alyn Smith appeared to describe the supporters of the motion as ‘small, angry bigots’, while MP Pete Wishart described it as a ‘nasty little motion’, which was ‘just plain wrong’. An amendment by Patrick Harvie to Mason’s motion, effectively changing the entire message, was signed by a number of SNP MSPs.

I believe that most SNP MSPs, supporters and members are tolerant, open-minded people, and the party has in recent years aimed to position itself on the progressive left of Scottish politics. The ‘big tent’, combined with the extent of May’s victory, could be putting this in danger. If the freshly swollen ranks of the party are capable of falling into disarray over a simple motion, what will happen when they begin to legislate? The furore over the sectarianism bill drew muted grumblings from the backbenches, and many staunchly nationalist commentators came out against it. The debate over gay marriage has further demonstrated the range of conflicting political views in the party. The leadership managed to stay out of it, disassociating itself from the motion and emphasising the manifesto commitment to consult on the issue. That consultation will, I hope, lead to legislation. Over the political term, there will be many points where the leadership is forced to pick one side of a fence, and that fence may just prove too high for some MSPs to climb.

I began writing this last week, as the debate was at its most heated. I had to temporarily abandon it to, rather fittingly, head off for a weekend’s camping in the small isles. On a rather rainy morning, six of us attempted to climb into one three-man tent to play cards. We learned the hard way that a tent can only take so many people before it gets more than a little uncomfortable, and if the SNP aren’t careful, they might discover the same thing too late. The unity that has won them so much support and praise may have come at the price of a more concrete and distinct ideology that will be required in the campaign for independence. While their broad appeal has survived so far, and has been immensely successful, it will be hard to articulate their vision for an independent Scotland if they all disagree on what that Scotland should look like. I’ll try and post again soon on what I think that vision should be, but for now I have to go and unpack some rather wet camping gear. In case you were wondering, we all left our cramped little tent as soon as the sun came out. I’ll leave you to make up your own mind about the potential symbolism there.

The Next Step

The SNP have won the trust of Scottish voters. Now, they must win it all over again.

Gerry Hassan called it a ‘Very Scottish Revolution’. Countless other commentators and politicians have been adding words like ‘historic’, ‘momentous’ and ‘game-changing’ to the growing list of superlatives with which they describe the SNP’s landslide election victory. And it is not just the sheer size of the win that earns it such an extravagant description. The implications are far more important. Aside from all the talk of ‘tectonic shifts’ away from traditional loyalties and heartlands, this election crucially represents the resounding acceptance by the Scottish people of a party that is very explicitly in favour of, as so many of those same commentators and politicians put it, ‘breaking up Britain’. Both Unionist and Nationalist politicians are rightly saying that it was not a mandate for the SNP to just declare independence outright, but it was also just over a week ago that Tavish Scott was saying ‘A vote for the SNP is a vote for independence’ in the leaders’ debate. I am not suggesting that the scare tactics of Labour, the Tories and the Liberal Democrats actually worked against them, inspiring people to go out and vote for a post-election UDI – polls on independence put support at between 30% and 40%, while the SNP got 45% of the vote – but it is very clearly not an issue which genuinely scares the Scottish people in the way that Unionist party leaders would like it to. The SNP’s victory in 2007 by a single seat suggests that back then, a considerable majority of Scotland’s voters were unwilling to endorse a party that wanted an independent Scottish state, whereas now – well, the SNP’s victory was an even more emphatic endorsement than Tony Blair received in 1997.

I remember a trip I went on in my final year of school – a small group of us in Paris, largely just to see the city and get a week off school, but the official reason was to attend a day-long conference on the involvement of young people in the European community. A number of important speakers – David Aaronovitch, David Davis and John Sergeant to name a few – gave us their esteemed opinions on the issues affecting Europe’s youth, who they claimed were far more involved in political life than the rows of snoozing teens in the conference hall suggested. One speaker in particular caught my attention and interest, as he – without much warning – exploded into an impassioned but somewhat fragmented rant about the evils of Scottish Nationalism. I was at that time rather naïve, uninvolved and uninterested when it came to Scottish politics, my attention diverted to Westminster by New Labour's dominance of the media. And so, listening to Charles Kennedy fume and frown over Alex Salmond’s ‘blinkered separatism’, I believed every word, and the crowd applauded him enthusiastically. This man was an MP and former party leader, and a Scottish one too. If he, a proud and intelligent Scot, saw independence as a danger, then surely he must have had a point? I left the conference hall announcing my firm support for the things he had said, my friends nodding in concurrence.

Yet just over a week ago, I was walking up to a doorway wearing an SNP rosette and preparing to persuade a first-time voter to vote for the party I had so readily opposed just a few years previously. The girl who opened the door told me that no, she wasn’t who I was looking for, her sister was in Glasgow. I asked if she herself was going to vote – ‘No, I’m only 16, but if I could, I’d vote SNP!’ Now, I’m not saying I believe everything that voters (or non-voters) tell me on the doorstep (alas, some just want to get rid of me), but the enthusiasm with which she gave her support took me by surprise. Not only was she far younger than I was when I began to understand independence as being about far more than flags and anthems, but she lived in one of the most affluent areas of Edinburgh, the Tory/Lib Dem stronghold of Ravelston. In my mind, most affluent Scots (especially those in the capital) are fairly small-c conservative, and the prospect of a change as radical as independence should by rights scare those who like things the way they are (especially if they are making plenty of money out of the way things are), whereas those who have the most to gain from a radical change should be more enthusiastic. Yet it was not just the more deprived Labour heartlands that rode the SNP juggernaut as it accelerated towards majority government - Nationalists decimated the Liberal Democrat seats and took Tory scalps too, notably David McLetchie’s former stronghold in Edinburgh Pentlands.

I know that in many ways independence was de-politicised for this election by the prospect of a referendum, and that plenty of people voted for the SNP because of issues other than the constitution. It helped too, that they are the only party not darkened by the shadow of Westminster - Labour are still recovering from Blair and Brown, and the Liberal Democrats have been crushed by the weight of their Tory bedfellows. But if the threat of a referendum itself is enough to send spittle flying from the mouths of Unionist leaders, then surely it should have some hold over the Scottish people? I would say no – this election, and the astounding result, must be seen as the people of Scotland looking Alex Salmond and his party in the eye and saying ‘Ok then - persuade us.’ The unionist parties have fallen behind public opinion, and the distance to which they have fallen is shown in the results. They have obscured the independence debate with talk of ‘separatism’ and ‘divorce’, when they should have been trying to win the argument with a positive, alternative vision for the future of the country. Looking back, I see Charles Kennedy’s outburst in Paris as one of negative stereotyping, brought on by an irrational and ingrained fear of one of the last radical ideas in mainstream UK politics. In those halcyon days before the credit crunch, fear worked. People were wealthier than ever, and the threat of economic catastrophe held great influence. But no longer can this win over Scotland’s impressionable youth. Nor can such apocalyptic prophecy inspire Scotland’s weary electorate. In an era of cuts and fear, these people want something to believe in and hope for. What really impresses people about Alex Salmond, and what persuaded me to don that rosette and march across Ravelston talking to Tories, is the sheer ambition of the SNP. The voters may not agree with independence now, but there is no denying that they have shown their admiration for the SNP’s belief in Scotland’s ability to improve itself. They have had four years to prove themselves, setting ambitious targets for climate change action and green energy, expanding free education, taking a successful and progressive approach to justice, and crucially de-privatising the Scottish NHS.

It is now time for the SNP to prove that they can go further. They need to persuade the older voters, who grew up as Britain declined, but remain fond of its institutions and history. They need to persuade the young, who can always be inspired by something radical, but are now restrained by an absence of hope. They need to persuade the wealthy that investors will not be scared off, and that Scotland really can keep its own financial sector afloat. And they must show the poor that the future will be fairer for them. Most importantly, they must persuade the centre-left liberal majority that Independence is the most progressive step we can take to ensure a secure and sustainable future for Scotland.

The SNP are finally in the right position to make the next step on Scotland’s journey. They have become the poster boys and girls of devolution, a symbol of Scotland making up its own mind away from the stuffy and archaic establishment of Westminster. But they cannot, and I think they will not, assume that this is a mandate to dictate the benefits of independence to the people. As Mr. Salmond himself has said, they do not have a ‘monopoly on wisdom’. It is up to Scotland, not the SNP, to decide what it can gain from independence. I firmly believe that the debate will only be won if a distinctive vision of Scotland’s future comes from below, not above. What do we want an independent Scotland to look like? What can we gain from it? What do we not want to lose from Britain, and how can we incorporate that into a new relationship with its constituent nations? Independence can only happen if the debate moves away from the traditional political elite and into the public realm. If it is done right, this national conversation could set the foundations for a new, ultra-democratic and more unified Scotland, built to a uniquely Scottish design. The referendum should be a creative tool, not a harbinger of division, and I believe that if that happens then there will be no stopping the enthusiasm of an inspired electorate.